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Abstract
This study uses a novel application of priming to provide experimental evidence that
aspirations and social comparisons may be influenced by non factual sources. A textual
narrative eliciting social comparison is shown to dramatically alter material aspirations.
This is despite the narrative not presenting any new information, relying instead on par-
ticipants’ existing knowledge. However the e↵ect of the priming rapidly dissipates when
attention is redirected to unrelated tasks. These findings build on literature examining
the influence of media, social comparison and aspirations on well-being. The findings
build support for the claim that media exposure may distort perceptions of status with
implications for satisfaction, education attainment and risk preferences. It also demon-
strates that at least in the short run, preferences in general and aspirations in particular
are highly suggestible.
1 Introduction
There is a large body of work demonstrating that social comparison and the gap be-
tween one’s aspirations and income substantially influence subjective well-being (SWB)
(Clark, 1996; Karlsson, Dellgran, Kilingander, and Garling, 2004; McBride, 2010; Mentza-
kis and Moro, 2008; Stutzer, 2004)1. Studies have also emerged demonstrating mass media
is able to influence SWB such as by changing aspirations (Bruni and Stanca, 2006; Buijzen
and Valkenburg, 2003; Yang and Oliver, 2010) or by increasing materialism (Burroughs
and Rindfleisch, 2002; Shrum, Burroughs, and Rindfleisch, 2005). These studies predom-
inantly rely on survey data however and thus are unable to elaborate on the mechanism
by which media exposure and SWB are related. We hypothesise that one important way
media presentations influence SWB is by distorting the reference group one compares
oneself to and thereby augmenting aspirations.
We used a controlled laboratory experiment to test whether a change in reference
group can change aspirations. We also examined whether one’s reference group is highly
suggestible. This was done by measuring the e↵ect of a subtle change in priming on
1In addition to these Easterlin (1974) and Easterlin, McVey, Switek, Sawangfa, and Zweig (2010) found
SWB is influenced by national wealth when comparing between nations but not by economic development over
a long time frame. Luttmer (2005) and Shields, Wheatley Price, and Wooden (2009) compared data between
neighbourhoods and revealed one’s income potentially imposing a negative externality on neighbours. Rayo and
Becker (2007) and Robson (2001) construct an evolutionary framework that o↵ers an appealing explanation for
why social comparison would be critically important to one’s SWB
1
1 INTRODUCTION
aspirations. Participants read a paragraph of a fictional character describing how she
is quite satisfied with her life. Half of the participants read the fictional character lives
in the Western suburbs of Sydney (generally low income) and the other half read the
fictional character lives in the Eastern suburbs of Sydney (generally upper income). Then
participants were asked to report their aspiration in terms of income. Half were asked
immediately, the other half were asked after completing a real e↵ort task and a risk
elicitation task. Participants with the Eastern priming reported approximately 30% higher
aspiration than participants with the Western priming when asked immediately. The e↵ect
disappeared when participants were asked after completing the tasks. This provides strong
support for one’s reference group influencing aspirations while being highly suggestible.
This study seeks to narrow the gap in the literature by providing experimental evidence
of aspirations and social comparisons being influenced by fictional sources2. This study
indirectly measures whether a fictional source is e↵ective in changing reference groups as
such a direct measure may reveal the intent of the study to participants and potentially
introduce demand e↵ects 3. Also this study does not examine whether media presentations
are able to influence SWB as it focuses on the underlying mechanism between media,
aspirations and SWB4.
In addition to providing support for fictionalised sources inducing social comparisons
this study contributes to the literature more broadly in two other ways. It reveals that
aspirations are highly suggestible with their being shown to be dramatically a↵ected by
a simple narrative that presents no new information. While there have been prior studies
examining the e↵ects of augmenting aspirations none have been uncovered that focuses
on measuring how readily aspirations are changed5.
Also this study introduces narrative priming as a mechanism for changing goals and
preferences to an economic context. Psychology and health studies are already familiar
with them, with narrative primes having been applied to tests of cognitive ability and
medical decision making (see Appel, 2011; Friedman-Wheeler, Rizzo-Busack, McIntosh,
Ahrens, and Haaga, 2010; Winterbottom, Bekker, Conner, and Mooney, 2008). How-
ever no prior economics studies incorporating them have been identified. It is hoped
the successful application of narrative priming in this study will embolden experimental
economists to adopt their use more frequently and expand the scope of inquiry, given the
very broad range of applications psychology and health has found for them.
While this study largely falls into the already expansive body of well-being research,
its focus on changing aspirations extends it to be relevant to a number of other fields.
This is due to aspirations having been shown to play a pivotal role for job satisfaction
(Poggi, 2010), attainment of tertiary education (Kiyama, 2010; Leung, Chen, and Lam,
2010), willingness to accept risk (Sokolowska, 2006), motivation to overcome poverty (Ray,
2006) and desire for empowerment and autonomy (van Kempen, 2009). The finding that a
2Factual sources and direct observation of neighbours have already been demonstrated to influence aspirations
and SWB (see Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 2010; Stutzer, 2004)
3See Zizzo (2010) for details regarding demand e↵ects and methods for overcoming or avoiding them
4The Satisfaction measure included in the experiment is introduced at the start of the experiment and is not
a dependent variable. Instead it is used to test whether di↵erences in life satisfaction influences how suggestible
one’s aspirations are
5Duncan, Haller, and Portes (1968) and Festinger (1942) construct theoretical models of how social com-
parison influences aspirations. Gibson and Lawrence (2010) and Leung, Chen, and Lam (2010) examined how
occupational and educational aspirations are influenced by peers. Koo and Fishbach (2010) demonstrated aspi-
rations are influenced by whether one considers the goals already accomplished or the goals still left to achieve
Sokolowska (2006) augmented aspirations in an experimental setting and examined whether this influenced risk
preferences
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fictional narrative is able to change material aspirations raises the possibility that media
messages may also be e↵ective in changing behaviours such as reducing risk taking or
encouraging higher academic achievement.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 details the experimental design and
procedure of this study. Section 3 presents the results and section 4 reports on robustness
tests. Section 5 analyses the implications of the findings, considers the limitations of the
study and poses questions for further research. The bulk of the experiment instructions
as well as data analysis results are reported in the Appendix.
2 Method
Design
The experiment consists of six components: a priming item, a risk task similar to that
of Eckel and Grossman (2008) albeit markedly simplified, an e↵ort task similar to that of
Segal (2008) and Cason, Gangadharan, and Nikiforakis (2011), a measure of aspirations,
life satisfaction measures and a questionnaire. There are four treatment groups in a two
by two design along dimensions of whether the participants have been presented with a
priming mechanism designed to elicit higher aspirations or lower aspirations and whether
the aspiration measure is obtained immediately following the priming or after a delay of
several minutes where attention is drawn to tasks that require some consideration (see
Table 1).
Table 1: Treatment Groups
Aspiration Measured Aspiration Measured
Before Risk & RE tasks After Risk & RE tasks
Eastern Priming High Immediate High Delay
Western Priming Low Immediate Low Delay
Figure 1 shows the arrangement of the elements. The ordering of each task takes into
consideration concerns of participants inadvertently having their focus drawn to issues
that may result in their providing di↵erent responses in later stages (Kahneman, Krueger,
Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone, 2006).
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Figure 1: Experiment Structure
Satisfaction and Mood Measures
Satisfaction is measured at the beginning of the experiment to introduce it as a control
and to ensure that it is not compromised by any element within the experiment. The
satisfaction measure from one to ten is identical to question 22 of the World Values
Survey 2005-2006. The question asks:
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these
days?
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In the same panel participants are asked to rate their mood at the moment. The
scale ranges from one to seven and is labelled from “Very Negative/Unhappy” to “Very
Positive/Happy”. This is to ensure participants separate considerations of their long
run satisfaction from life considerations with how they are feeling in that moment. Also
the di↵erence in scale of measurement somewhat inhibits the participants from simply
choosing the same rating for both without considering them independently.
Mood is measured again at the conclusion of the experiment to check whether any
notable change in mood has arisen as a consequence of the priming or participating in the
experiment otherwise.
The mood at the conclusion of the experiment is also measured on a scale from one
to seven to ensure the result is clearly comparable to the initial mood measure.
Priming Mechanism
The narrative priming embodies the central element common to all media stimuli: the
communication of a story. It is not perfectly representative of all media items however as
it is presented in a textual format and elicits social comparison along material dimensions
only. It is both too narrow and too simplistic to interpret a positive result of this exper-
iment to be a proof that media presentations are influencing SWB. Nevertheless the use
of a simple textual prime does allow powerful inferences to be drawn as the simplicity of
the priming o↵ers a tremendous degree of control6. Also as the simple priming is repre-
sentative of the underlying message of media presentations it allows the findings of this
study to be applied to the message being conveyed as opposed to some specific visual or
audial element.
The priming mechanism is in two stages and operates by activating pre-existing stereo-
types of wealth associated with residents of two districts of Sydney. The Eastern Suburbs
is the district selected for the high aspiration prime as it is widely regarded as an a✏u-
ent district while the Western Suburbs is selected for the low aspirations prime as it is
perceived widely as a working class district.
The first stage of the priming mechanism asks the participants to rate on a five point
scale how costly it is in general to live in each of the Northern, Southern, Eastern and
Western Suburbs of Sydney7 (see Figure 2). Only responses from participants who rate
living in the Eastern Suburbs to be more costly than the Western Suburbs are accepted
as the priming mechanism would be ine↵ective for anyone not holding this perception.
The first stage reminding participants of their preconceived beliefs of a✏uence of each
district also serves to make these concerns salient for the second stage of the priming that
involves a short fictional narrative being presented. The narrative for the High Aspiration
treatments is as follows8:
Samantha (not her real name) is a former graduate of the University of Sydney
having studied Economics. She has lived in the Eastern Suburbs for the past
eleven years. She has a mortgage and a daughter of primary school age.
6Where a textual narrative can change the reference group from being an a✏uent class to working class by
altering one word, a television program or print advertisement would necessarily enact a substantially greater
number of changes and thus introduce confounding variables
7This confirms the appropriateness of the district selections with 96% of participating domestic students
and 81% of participating international students identifying the average cost of living in the Eastern Suburbs as
being strictly greater than the Western Suburbs
8The Low Aspiration groups had “Eastern Suburbs” replaced by “Western Suburbs”
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Figure 2: District A✏uence Check
I notice a sense of community here in the Eastern Suburbs with the neigh-
bours all being fairly friendly. There’s plenty to get out and do to keep the
kids entertained and there’s a few nice restaurants and cafes in walking dis-
tance.
We live near a big train hub so getting about isn’t too hard. That’s fairly
important as my husband and I both work a little way from home but the
commute’s quite tolerable.
Another really important thing for me is decent schools. I’m quite happy
with the local primary school my daughter goes to. You just get a sense that
it’s a safe, friendly environment and you can tell the teachers just love what
they do.
As it is crucial that any measured di↵erence in aspirations be resulting from pre-
existing notions of a✏uence, care is taken to ensure the priming mechanism does not
include any explicit suggestions of wealth or a✏uence. Similarly no numbers were shown
in the priming (with the exception of the stage countdown timer), nor were any material
or consumption considerations raised. This maximises the likelihood any di↵erence in the
aspiration measure between treatments is due to a genuine change in aspirations along a
material dimension.
Although attempting to reflect a plausible account of an individual’s perceptions of
their lifestyle participants should nonetheless find the narrative contrived. All participants
are also informed the narrative is ‘stylised’ prior to viewing the item. This is to ensure
the participants are aware the narrative is fictional. Nevertheless the exploitation of
pre-existing notions of a✏uence in the priming is typical of many forms of advertising,
especially luxury and fashion goods.
The requirement that the priming does not introduce any new information is adhered
to by the narrative reporting the personal opinion of a fictional character. Regardless of
participants’ notions of lifestyles in the Eastern and Western Suburbs, the account of one
woman pleased with her neighbourhood’s sense of community, accessibility of transport
and quality of schools cannot impart anything they do not already know9.
9Even those with a particularly negative opinion of working class districts must be aware they must never-
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To ensure the participants read the narrative it is displayed for one minute, more than
twice the time necessary for a native English speaker to read the material.
Aspiration Measure
An aspirational income is obtained by asking participants to envision themselves in a
future scenario where they have completed their studies and are living on their own. The
question posed is as follows:
Suppose that you have finished your studies and have been working as a pro-
fessional in the field of your choice for a few years. Also suppose that you are
living on your own in Sydney.
Please indicate what gross (before tax) annual salary you feel would be necessary
for you to maintain a reasonably comfortable standard of living.
Ignore inflation and answer in today’s dollar values.
This measure is used as opposed to directly asking one’s goal income level as doing
so may result in the aim of this study being su ciently transparent that demand e↵ects
would become a concern10. Long and complicated measures of aspirations such as that
utilised in Koo and Fishbach (2010) are avoided for this reason. A minimum income
for a future stage of life measure is comparable to that used in Stutzer (2004) and is
considered a reasonable proxy for income aspiration levels while being su ciently opaque
that demand e↵ects do not need to be considered.
The majority of participants of the study are undergraduate university students. Con-
sequently a substantial variation in what participants believe to be the costs of inde-
pendent living in one’s post study phase of life is anticipated. To account for this the
participants are also asked:
What do you think is the current average gross salary for Sydney residents?
The ultimate aspiration measure is the ratio of the aspirational income to the average
salary estimate. The average salary estimate for all treatment groups is placed after
the risk and e↵ort task to ensure perceptions of average salaries do not influence one’s
willingness to accept risk or e↵ort contribution decisions.
Risk and E↵ort Tasks and Questionnaire
The risk task is a simplification of that used in Eckel and Grossman (2008) with
participants presented with a panel asking them their preference between six options (see
Appendix A). The first option entails no risk while each following option has increasing
expected payouts but also increasing distribution of potential payments. Of the options
involving chance the probabilities of each outcome is 50% to ensure participants are able to
clearly observe expected payout increases with each riskier option. All treatment groups
are presented with the same risk task.
In the e↵ort task participants are asked to match words with numbers provided in
a key displayed in a panel above the questions (see Appendix A). This is very similar
in design to Segal (2008) although that study measured respondents’ time and accuracy
to complete the task while this study allows participants the option to skip the task at
theless have some residents happy with their quality of life
10As truthful reporting of aspirational incomes cannot be incentivised with monetary payments demand e↵ects
would not be preventable
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any time. Participants are o↵ered a very large monetary incentive to match as many
words as possible in four minutes which is intended to be moderately restrictive. E↵ort
will be measured by the number of words correctly matched in the time provided. The
hefty monetary incentive for each correct response ($2 for a potential payout of $60) is to
encourage all participants to at least attempt to match a few words and avoid a clustering
of responses with no attempt made. As Segal (2008) found that performance in a coding
speed test of this nature is not strongly predicted by ability but rather motivation to
perform, any significant di↵erences in performance between High Aspiration and Low As-
piration treatment groups is likely to be based on aspirations influencing one’s motivation
to perform.
The questionnaire is presented following the average salary estimate and includes ques-
tions of parental education levels, region of birth and field of study (see Appendix A).
Procedure
The sessions were conducted on computer terminals using zTree, a program designed
for carrying out economics experiments (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were invited through the University of Sydney’s online pool of registered
participants. The potential pool of participants are all recruited on campus and are pre-
dominantly undergraduate students at the University of Sydney. The majority are within
the Business faculty or Economics School but almost all fields of study are represented to
some extent.
As the experiment did not involve participants interacting with one another the ex-
periment was conducted on a revolving door basis throughout the day. Care was taken to
ensure participants who had completed the experiment did not communicate with those
not yet undertaking the experiment but as there is no strategy element to the paid com-
ponent of the experiment there would be little useful information participants would have
been able to pass on.
The experiment was conducted over two days with participants informed that only
one in ten will be paid for their responses prior to accepting an invitation. Payment was
determined by a randomly determined number being matched to a unique identifying
code all participants were presented with when arriving at the lab. For details of how
payment was determined see Appendix B. Payment was made on a separate day once the
experiment was concluded.
3 Results
222 observations were obtained. Of these 27 participants failed to identify higher
living costs in the Eastern Suburbs of Sydney as compared to the Western Suburbs. As
the priming mechanism requires that participants be aware of the relative a✏uence of
these districts, these observations were discarded.
Only 4 participants indicated being born in Middle East/North Africa, 6 indicated
Europe and 8 indicated Americas. To reduce potential for spurious results due to small
sample size those categories were dropped and all such observations were grouped into
‘Other’. Similarly only 4 participants indicated their parent language as an Indian dialect
and 7 indicated a European language, hence these categories were dropped and the obser-
vations grouped into ‘Other’. 2 participants indicating their chosen major as econometrics
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were merged with economics in an ‘Econ/metrics’ category11.
A summary of key dependent variables is shown in Table 2. The table reveals the
presence of outliers which is confirmed by plotting aspirational income against average
income estimates (see Figure 3).
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
High Immediate
Aspirational Income 51 67088.24 20315.93 30000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 51 52362.75 13831.51 20000 95000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 51 1.305689 .3065522 .7142857 2.111111
Low Immediate
Aspirational Income 50 52320 15602.77 25000 100000
Average Salary Estimate 50 55100 16667.52 24000 110000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 50 .9794683 .2400336 .4285714 1.538462
High Delayed
Aspirational Income 49 100857.1 147889.2 5000 900000
Average Salary Estimate 49 52683.67 25435.52 2500 200000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 49 2.123284 2.712889 .025 14
Low Delayed
Aspirational Income 45 69533.33 72355.37 4000 500000
Average Salary Estimate 45 55755.56 76932.42 4000 550000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 45 1.3439043 .5219176 .3 2.857143
The five extreme observations are accounted for by identifying them as such in an
“Outlier” dummy variable. A sixth observation is also identified as an Outlier as it
boasted an aspirational to average income ratio of 14 due to an average annual salary
estimate of only AU$2500. The resulting distribution of aspirational income to average
income estimates according to treatment group does not reveal any immediately apparent
di↵erences between treatments (see Figure 6, p.27).
Dummy variables are created for each response of the categorical variables of parent
language, birth region and area of study.
Risk is coded to integer values between 0 (for the certain choice) and 5 (highest gamble
between $80 and $0). Similarly parental education is coded to integer values between 1
and 5 with responses of “unknown” recoded as missing. 8 observations were excluded
from some estimates due to unknown parental education attainment.
Dummy variables for whether the treatment was High or Low and also whether they
were Immediate or Delayed along with interaction terms are created12.
Estimating the e↵ect of the priming without any control variables yields a significant
result along all dimensions (Table 3, column 1). Including all available control variables
the priming is found to have a statistically significant e↵ect only for the treatment groups
where the aspirational income and average salary estimates were measured immediately
following the priming (excerpt shown in Table 3, column 2; complete estimate shown in
11Estimates using the original categorisation of data were also conducted but arrived at the same outcomes
for the treatment variables and thus not reported
12See page 23 for description of variables
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Figure 3: Aspirational Income against Average Salary Estimate
Table 7, p.24). This result is still observed when a more restrictive criteria for whether
the control variables are relevant is used and several control variables are dropped from
the estimation13 (Table 3, column 3).
The 27 discarded observations are checked to see whether the priming had a reverse ef-
fect on those who indicated the Western Suburbs as being more costly. Only 7 participants
indicated the Western Suburbs being strictly more costly on average than the Eastern.
There are too few observations in each treatment to ascertain whether the priming had
the reverse e↵ect for these participants. No results are reported for these observations.
The relative e↵ect of priming on aspirational income ratio is shown in Table 8 (p.26).
This reveals the priming is still significant to the 1% confidence level for the immediate
treatment groups. However the relative estimation also indicates a significant change in
aspirations between the Low Immediate and Low Delayed treatment groups as well as the
outliers no longer being significant while gender now appears to be. No clear explanation
can be provided for these divergent results.
The e↵ect of priming on risk is estimated using ordered probit regression. Table 4
column 1 estimates risk against the treatment dummies only and finds no statistically
significant di↵erence across treatment groups. This is also suggested by Figure 7 (p.29)
showing histograms of risk preferences across treatment groups. When control variables
are included in the estimation however a significant di↵erence is observed between the High
and Low Delayed treatments. Table 4 column 2 shows an excerpt of the risk estimated
against the treatment dummies as well as all available control variables (complete estimate
shown in Table 9, p.28).
The e↵ect of priming on real e↵ort is estimated using tobit regression due to a large
13Satisfaction, final mood, parental education, area of study, year of study and whether the participant
registered as an outlier retained
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Table 3: E↵ect of Priming on Aspirational to Average Income Ratio
Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3)
Low to High Immediate 0.33*** 0.39*** 0.38***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.11)
Low to High Delayed 0.78** 0.53 0.43
(0.40) (0.35) (0.31)
High Immediate to Delayed 0.82** 0.32 0.24
(0.39) (0.22) (0.20)
Low Immediate to Delayed 0.36*** 0.18 0.19
(0.08) (0.20) (0.19)
Notes:
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Series (1) includes only treatment dummies as independent variables
Series (2) includes all control variables
Series (3) includes some control variables
Table 4: E↵ect of Priming on Risk
Regression Series
Risk (1) (2) (3)
Low to High Immediate 0.04 -0.1 0.06
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Low to High Delayed -0.34 -0.59** -0.46*
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
High Immediate to Delayed -0.19 -0.32 -0.17
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Low Immediate to Delayed 0.19 0.16 0.23
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23)
Notes:
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
Estimates obtained by ordered probit regression
Series (1) includes only treatment dummies as independent variables
Series (2) includes all control variables
Series (3) includes some control variables
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clustering of results at the maximum real e↵ort outcome. Priming is not found to have
an e↵ect on real e↵ort in these estimates.
An ordered probit estimation is conducted with satisfaction against the control vari-
ables in addition to risk, real e↵ort and aspirational income ratio. The treatment group
dummies were not included as satisfaction was measured prior to exposure to priming
and participants were allocated to treatment groups randomly. Table 11 (p.31) indicates
initial and final mood are related with satisfaction.
Mood change is estimated using ordered probit estimation against the treatment dum-
mies and all control variables. It is not found to di↵er between treatments but is influenced
by one’s aspirational income ratio, one’s initial mood and one’s parents’ language (see Ta-
ble 12, p.32).
4 Robustness Tests
As the experiment implemented a between subjects design it is perhaps also necessary
that participants in the High aspiration treatment groups consider the Eastern Suburbs
to be strictly above average in costliness and those in the Low aspirations groups consider
the Western Suburbs to be average or below average. The data is re-analysed by applying
a requirement that participants of the High aspiration treatments identify the average
costliness of living in the Eastern Suburbs as being 4 or 5 while those in the Low aspiration
treatments identify the costliness of the Western Suburbs being 3 or lower14. Table 13 p.34
shows some additional observations are discarded from the High aspiration treatments but
the data largely is unaltered. The analysis with this set of observations provides the same
findings as those already reported and are thus not included.
Squared terms for the control variables of risk, real e↵ort, father and mother education
and year of study are included in estimates of the e↵ect of the priming (excerpt of estimate
shown in Table 14, p.34). The squared and linear terms are not significant at the 5% level
and the conclusions regarding the priming and the other control variables are unchanged.
As inclusion of the squared terms do not meaningfully contribute to the interpretation
they are not included in the main analysis.
The estimate of satisfaction and mood change revealed the potential for multicollinear-
ity problems arising from initial and final mood and satisfaction being highly correlated.
A pairwise correlation matrix is obtained (see Table 15, p.36). This reveals potential
multicollinearity issues between area of birth and parental language, area of birth and
international student, mother’s education, father’s education and satisfaction and mood.
The variance inflation factor is obtained for each of the estimates of the e↵ect of
priming on aspiration income ratio (Tables 17 and 18, p.35). As none of the VIF values
exceed 5 multicollinearity is not considered a concern.
The results may be distorted if a significant proportion of participants merely guessed
the Eastern Suburbs are more a✏uent than the Western Suburbs. Domestic students are
expected to overwhelmingly be aware of the wealth divide in Sydney which is confirmed by
the observation of 109 of 113 (96%) domestic students indicating living costs in the Eastern
Suburbs are strictly greater on average compared to the Western Suburbs. Analysis
using only domestic students is conducted and results indicated in Table 19 (p.38). This
reduces the number of observations to 101 (some observations lost due to missing values for
parental education) and results in the Low to High Immediate treatments no longer being
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level if all control variables are included.
14recall the scale has 5 points with 1 labelled “Well Below Average” and 5 labelled “Well Above Average”
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However the priming coe cient is statistically significant when the restrictive criteria
for inclusion of control variables is applied. As there is no reason to believe international
students were likely to guess correctly the relative a✏uence of each district, this is deemed
not to be a concern.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The summary results without outliers (Table 6, p.24) hint at the priming significantly
influencing aspirations but only when they are immediately preceding the aspiration mea-
sure15. This result appears borne out of the priming changing perceptions of the minimum
income necessary for a reasonable quality of life rather than a change in the mean income
estimates.
OLS estimation confirms the priming influences aspirations if they are measured imme-
diately following the priming (Table 7, p.24). This holds whether all control variables are
included or only a subset. With the exception of outliers no other variable is significant
in influencing aspirations. The magnitude of the e↵ect is noteworthy with a log-linear
estimate revealing approximately a 30% decrease in expected aspirational income ratio
if the Eastern Suburbs priming is replaced with the Western Suburbs priming (Table 8,
p.26).
The results suggest the High priming did not influence aspirations while those in the
Low priming had their aspirations reduced momentarily16. This would be consistent with
Dickson (1982) finding greater weight being placed on a negative narrative.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 (p. 24) show no significant di↵erence in aspirations between
the High Delayed and Low Delayed treatments. Thus the e↵ect of the priming is largely
lost after one completes a risk and real e↵ort task. It is unclear however whether the e↵ect
being dissipated is a result of a short period of time having elapsed, one needing to focus
attention on an unrelated matter or whether the risk and real e↵ort tasks introduced
a new reference point (e↵ectively functioning as priming mechanisms themselves) and
consequently diluted the e↵ect of the priming.
The ephemeral nature of the priming is also supported by risk attitudes being influ-
enced by the priming only if one completed the risk choice immediately following viewing
the priming item17 (see Table 9 and Figure 7, p.28). The risk measure not being sig-
nificantly influenced by aspirational income ratio indicates one’s ex ante aspiration level
did not have an e↵ect on risk preferences. This suggests ex ante aspiration is not applied
to the risk task performed in the context of a laboratory experiment but the change in
aspirations induced within the experiment did influence risk preferences.
Of significant interest is the result being in the opposite direction than anticipated.
Participants exposed to the higher aspiration priming had a stronger preference for less
risky choices. Some caution must be taken as ordered probit estimation is not significant at
the 5% level of confidence if using the more restrictive criteria for what control variables to
include in the estimation. Nevertheless the direction of the result is clear and contradicts
the model proposed by March (1988) and experimental evidence obtained in Sokolowska
(2006) which suggested those with a larger gap between their actual wealth and their goal
wealth would be more inclined to accept riskier choices.
15The di↵erence between High Delayed and Low Delayed is not significant at the 5% confidence level
16Perhaps a narrative describing someone living in an a✏uent district being pleased with her life failed to
move people but the narrative of someone living in a working class district but quite content left a stronger
impression
17Recall the Delayed groups completed the risk task immediately following the priming
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A potential explanation is o↵ered by Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) which augments
von Neumann and Morgenstern Expected Utility theory by incorporating an additional
utility gain derived from attaining one’s aspiration level. This results in participants being
more risk tolerant if the only options that o↵er a chance of achieving their aspiration
levels are more risky while they may be risk averse should the safer options assure them
of achieving their aspiration level. This is most clearly illustrated with an example.
Consider an experiment where participants are implicitly primed with an aspiration
level similar to the method of Sokolowska (2006). They are o↵ered two gambles as shown
in Table 5 and asked to report which they prefer. Here gamble A is riskier with a greater
variation but also higher expected return. Assume an equal number of participants would
prefer each gamble if participants are first explicitly primed with an aspiration level of
$20. If however the aspiration level was $40, Diecidue and van de Ven (2008) and intuition
would suggest a higher proportion of participants would choose gamble B. Hence an
increase in aspiration level from $20 to $40 would be expected to decrease the observed
risk tolerance. The same intuition and model would suggest however that an increase
in aspiration from $40 to $80 should induce more participants to prefer gamble A than
B given gamble A is the only option with any possibility of achieving the aspiration
level. Hence this demonstrates risk preferences may exhibit a U shape with respect to
aspirations, initially decreasing as aspirations increase from a very low starting point but
eventually increasing as aspirations continue to rise.
Table 5: Hypothetical Gamble Choices
50% Chance 50% Chance
Gamble A $100 $20
Gamble B $60 $40
Recalling that participants were not primed with an explicit aspiration level in this
study it is impossible to translate the aspiration level reported by the aspirational income
ratio into benchmarks for the risk task. Further research would be necessary to examine
whether there is a U-shaped relation between risk preferences and aspirations.
E↵ort is not found to be related to treatment group nor to the aspirational income
ratio (see Table 10, p.30). As international students were observed to perform worse
it is likely confidence with English impacted on the results. The majority of domestic
participants are found to have achieved full scores on the e↵ort task. Regrettably this
clustering results in the task not being able to inform whether the priming was able to
influence motivation and willingness to contribute e↵ort. It is suggested any future studies
utilising such procedures should make the time more restrictive, include more options to
lengthen the task or reduce the attractiveness of the extrinsic reward18.
Satisfaction was not found to be significant with any of the measured control variables
with the exception of mood (see Table 11 p.31). Mood change is more intriguing with
the observation that the aspirational income ratio is a significant and negative predictor
(Table 12 p.32). This may be due to those with higher ex ante aspiration levels also
having higher expectations prior to starting the experiment and are thus more likely to
be disappointed.
18The payment may have been large enough it crowded out any potential intrinsic motivations, see Pokorny
(2008) for details regarding incentive crowding out
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Whether the susceptibility to being primed was influenced by various characteristics
such as gender and risk preferences was examined. None of the control variables clearly
demonstrated any influence on one’s susceptibility to the narrative changing their aspira-
tions.
As the priming mechanism does not explicitly set an aspirational goal it is necessary
to consider whether the results actually reflect a change in aspirations19. Although the
narrative prime allows considerations other than material aspirations to be introduced,
such as personal opinions regarding public transport and education, the aspiration mea-
sure specifically asks the minimum income one feels necessary for a reasonable standard
of living. Provided that this is an acceptable representation of material aspirations, a
significant di↵erence across the High Immediate and Low Immediate treatments reveals
the priming has succeeded in changing aspirations.
However this design cannot prove it is the social comparison dimension that specifi-
cally caused the change in aspirations. For example participants may have an unidentified
tendency to associate the word “Eastern” with higher cost of living than “Western” that
is unrelated to perceptions of a✏uence of those districts. There is no reason to believe
this has occurred however. As the only di↵erence between the High and Low treatments
was the reference to “Eastern” or “Western” Suburbs, any alternative explanation must
plausibly suggest how swapping these two words could have produced the change in aspi-
rations without considerations of the a✏uence of each district being involved. No alter-
native explanation is forthcoming. The priming operating by eliciting social comparison
considerations is thus by far the most likely explanation.
Even if one accepts that a fictional source can influence aspirations by eliciting social
comparison considerations this study is unable to demonstrate this mechanism is the
only one influencing aspirations or SWB. For example it is likely that some fictional
presentation eliciting social comparison would able to a↵ect SWB without influencing
aspirations. What other mechanisms may operate to influence SWB and aspirations are
beyond the scope of this study however and would require further investigation.
Also more research is necessary to identify whether there are cumulative e↵ects to ex-
posure and whether more vivid stimuli (such as an engrossing film) can impart a stronger
or more enduring influence. There is also scope to investigate whether narratives commu-
nicating dimensions other than peer comparison, such as perceptions of fate control and
self e cacy, would similarly influence aspirations20.
Further research is necessary to continue strengthening the link between media expo-
sure and SWB as this study is not generalisable to real world media presentations. Rather
it establishes evidence that fictional presentations are able to elicit aspiration change that
has been demonstrated to influence SWB. Empirical or experimental studies incorporating
real world media items or stimuli more closely resembling them are required for further
insights on how media exposure influences SWB.
19See Koo and Fishbach (2010) and Sokolowska (2006) for examples of explicitly setting aspirations
20See Leung, Chen, and Lam (2010) for details of how fate control and self e cacy influences educational
aspirations
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A EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Appendices
A Experiment Design
Risk Item
The following is the risk question all participants were presented with.
Please indicate which option you prefer among the following gambles:
• 100% chance of earning $30
• 50% chance of earning $24 and 50% chance of earning $40
• 50% chance of earning $18 and 50% chance of earning $50
• 50% chance of earning $12 and 50% chance of earning $60
• 50% chance of earning $6 and 50% chance of earning $70
• 50% chance of earning $6 and 50% chance of earning $70
• 50% chance of earning $0 and 50% chance of earning $80
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A EXPERIMENT DESIGN
E↵ort Task
The following is a screenshot of the coding speed that constituted the real e↵ort task.
Figure 4: Coding Speet Test
20
A EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Questionnaire
The following is a screenshot of the questionnaire.
Figure 5: Questionnaire
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B PAYMENT MECHANISM
B Payment Mechanism
Participants were informed only one in ten would be paid on the basis of their responses
in the email inviting them to sessions for the experiment, in the Participant Information
Statement provided with the email and also prior to beginning the experiment when they
arrived at the laboratory.
The mechanism for determining who was paid was described as follows:
One in ten participants will be randomly chosen to receive payment. In Week
2 you will be sent an email indicating the winning number which is the unit
value of the S&P/ASX 200 at its close on Tuesday 2nd August. If the unit
value of your Individual ID (as indicated on the card you received at the start
of the experiment) matches this number you will be paid for your responses in
the experiment.
For example:
You have Group ID number 3 and Individual ID number 38. On Tuesday 2nd
August the closing value of the S&P/ASX 200 is 4468.1. The winning number
is therefore 8. As your Individual ID ends in 8 you will be paid based on your
responses.
The email in week 2 will include details of how to collect payment. You will
need to bring your card with you when collecting payment so please
retain your card.
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C ADDITIONAL RESULTS
C Additional Results
Description of Variables
Aspiration Ratio Ratio of minimum in-
come for reasonable standard of living
to average salary estimate
Low Treatment group dummy variable
High Treatment group dummy variable
Delayed Treatment group dummy vari-
able
Immediate Treatment group dummy vari-
able
InteractionLD Treatment group dummy
variable
InteractionHD Treatment group dummy
variable
Satisfaction Ascending indicator of life
satisfaction from 1 - 10
Father Edu five point parental education
scale, 1 - no secondary, 2 - completed
secondary, 3 - diploma, 4 - undergrad-
uate, 5 - postgraduate
Mother Edu five point parental educa-
tion scale, 1 - no secondary, 2 - com-
pleted secondary, 3 - diploma, 4 - un-
dergraduate, 5 - postgraduate
Study... Field of study dummy variables,
Economics/econometrics comparison
category
Year of Study Indicator from 1 - 4 with 4
representing 4th year or above
Initial Mood Ascending mood indicator
from 1 - 7 measured at start of exper-
iment
Final Mood Ascending mood indicator
from 1 - 7 measured at end of experi-
ment
outlier Dummy variable indicating
whether observation identified as out-
lier
Risk Indicator of risk choice from 0 (cer-
tain outcome) to 5 (most risky option)
Real E↵ort Score obtained on e↵ort task
(possible score from 0 - 30)
Male Dummy Gender dummy variable,
female comparison category
International Student Domestic/international
student dummy variable, domestic
comparison category
Parent Lang... Parent language dummy
variables, English comparison cate-
gory
Born... Region of birth dummy variables,
Aus/NZ comparison category
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C ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Tables and Figures
Table 6: Summary Statistics without Outliers
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HighImmediate
Aspirational Income 51 67088.24 20315.93 30000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 51 52362.75 13831.51 20000 95000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 51 1.305689 .3065522 .7142857 2.111111
LowImmediate
Aspirational Income 50 52320 15602.77 25000 100000
Average Salary Estimate 50 55100 16667.52 24000 110000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 50 .9794683 .2400336 .4285714 1.538462
HighDelayed
Aspirational Income 44 68227.27 27358.82 10000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 44 49409.09 11422.78 2500 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 44 1.416446 .5786999 .1818182 3
LowDelayed
Aspirational Income 44 59750 30818.39 4000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 44 44522.73 15692.52 4000 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 44 1.353786 .5236756 .3 2.857143
Table 7: E↵ect of Priming on Aspirational to Average Income Ratio
Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.33*** -0.39*** -0.38***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.11)
Delayed 0.82** 0.32 0.24
(0.39) (0.22) (0.20)
InteractionLD -0.45 -0.13 -0.05
(0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
High 0.78** 0.53 0.43
(0.40) (0.35) (0.31)
Immediate -0.36*** -0.18 -0.19
(0.08) (0.20) (0.19)
InteractionHI -0.45 -0.13 -0.05
(0.40) (0.39) (0.36)
Satisfaction 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Father Edu 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Mother Edu -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Study Accounting 0.48 0.45 0.48 0.45
(0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30)
Study Finance -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18)
Study other business 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Study other -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Year of Study 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Final Mood -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
outlier 5.41** 5.47*** 5.41** 5.47***
(2.17) (2.10) (2.17) (2.10)
Initial Mood 0.02 0.02
(0.11) (0.11)
Risk 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.06)
Real E↵ort -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Male Dummy -0.17 -0.17
(0.15) (0.15)
International Student -0.17 -0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.01 0.01
(0.29) (0.29)
Parent Lang Other 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.20)
Born East Asia 0.09 0.09
(0.32) (0.32)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.02 0.02
(0.20) (0.20)
Born Other 0.28 0.28
(0.20) (0.20)
cons 1.31*** 2.23** 1.87** 1.34*** 2.02* 1.68**
(0.04) (0.98) (0.79) (0.08) (1.03) (0.83)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
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Table 8: Relative E↵ect of Priming on Aspirational Income Ratio
Log of Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.31***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Delayed 0.10 0.06 0.03
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10)
InteractionLD 0.17 0.19 0.21
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
High 0.12 0.13 0.10
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
Immediate -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.24***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
InteractionHI 0.17 0.19 0.21
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Satisfaction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Father Edu 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother Edu -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Study Accounting 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Study Finance -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Study other business 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.18
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Study other -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Year of Study -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Final Mood -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
outlier 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.60
(0.90) 0.91 (0.90) 0.91
Initial Mood 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.05)
Risk 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Real E↵ort -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Male Dummy -0.16** -0.16**
(0.08 (0.08
International Student -0.08 -0.08
(0.12) (0.12)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.07 0.07
(0.14) (0.14)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Log of Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent Lang Other 0.02 0.02
(0.10) (0.10)
Born East Asia -0.11 -0.11
(0.18) (0.18)
Born Asia Sub cont -0.01 -0.01
(0.12) (0.12)
Born Other 0.17 0.17
(0.13) (0.13)
cons 0.24*** 1.20* 0.62 0.22*** 1.14* 0.54
(0.03) (0.63) (0.43) (0.06) (0.64) (0.43)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Figure 6: Aspirational against Average Income without outliers
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Table 9: Ordered Probit Estimate of Influences on Risk
Regression Series
Risk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.04 0.1 -0.06
(0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
Delayed -0.19 -0.32 -0.17
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
InteractionLD 0.38 0.49 0.40
(0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
High -0.34 -0.59** -0.46*
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25)
Immediate -0.19 -0.16 -0.23
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23)
InteractionHI 0.38 0.49 0.40
(0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
Aspiration Ratio 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Satisfaction -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Father Edu -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Mother Edu 0.19** 0.17* 0.19** 0.17*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Study Accounting -0.35 -0.30 -0.35 -0.30
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Study Finance 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30)
Study other business -0.40 -0.42 -0.40 -0.42
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
Study other -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Year of Study -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Final Mood 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
outlier -0.20 -0.25 -0.20 -0.25
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34)
Initial Mood -0.10 -0.10
(0.12) (0.12)
Real E↵ort 0.04* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02)
Male Dummy 0.32* 0.32*
(0.17) (0.17)
International Student 0.19 0.19
(0.24) (0.24)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.09 0.09
(0.24) (0.24)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Risk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent Lang Other -0.15 -0.15
(0.28) (0.28)
Born East Asia -0.19 -0.19
(0.30) (0.30)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.19 0.19
(0.31) (0.31)
Born Other -0.09 -0.09
(0.39) (0.39)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Figure 7: Risk Histograms
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Table 10: Tobit Estimate of Influences on Real E↵ort
Regression Series
Real E↵ort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low 0.02 -0.63 -0.30
(1.40) (1.41) (1.39)
Delayed -0.67 0.50 0.43
(1.42) (1.42) (1.46)
InteractionLD 1.49 -0.13 0.23
(2.07) (2.08) (2.09)
High -1.51 0.76 0.07
(1.52) (1.53) (1.56)
Immediate -0.82 -0.37 -0.66
(1.50) (1.48) (1.43)
InteractionHI 1.49 -0.13 0.23
(2.07) (2.08) (2.09)
Aspiration Ratio -0.67 -0.56 -0.67 -0.56
(0.43) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47)
Satisfaction 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.55
(0.38) (0.47) (0.38) (0.47)
Father Edu 0.39 0.28 0.39 0.28
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
Mother Edu -0.81 -0.68 -0.81 -0.68
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Study Accounting -1.08 -0.82 -1.08 -0.82
(2.00) (1.95) (2.00) (1.95)
Study Finance -2.78 -2.00 -2.78 -2.00
(1.88) (1.89) (1.88) (1.89)
Study other business 1.30 0.88 1.30 0.88
(2.39) (2.41) (2.39) (2.41)
Study other 0.20 -0.21 0.20 -0.21
(1.58) (1.61) (1.58) (1.61)
Year of Study 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.21
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Final Mood 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.65
(0.76) (0.58) (0.76) (0.58)
outlier 1.42 0.55 1.42 0.55
(3.88) (4.15) (3.88) (4.15)
International Student -4.20*** -3.03*** -4.20*** -3.03***
(1.31) (1.10) (1.31) (1.10)
Initial Mood -0.01 -0.01
(0.78) (0.78)
Risk 0.69** 0.69**
(0.31) (0.31)
Male Dummy -0.38 -0.38
(1.06) (1.06)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.91 0.91
(1.55) (1.55)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Real E↵ort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent Lang Other -1.01 -1.01
(1.71) (1.71)
Born East Asia 1.28 1.28
(1.68) (1.68)
Born Asia Sub cont 1.89 1.89
(1.93) (1.93)
Born Other 1.55 1.55
(1.98) (1.98)
cons 30.07*** 24.01*** 25.67*** 30.91*** 23.8*** 26.04***
(1.04) (4.52) (3.89) (1.17) (4.55) (3.94)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Table 11: Ordered Probit Estimate of Influences on Satisfaction
Regression Series
Satisfaction (1) (2)
Aspiration Ratio 0.05 0.06
(0.07) (0.06)
Father Edu 0.06 0.07
(0.07) (0.07)
Mother Edu 0.04 0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Study Accounting 0.02 -0.12
(0.35) (0.31)
Study Finance 0.28 0.32
(0.33) (0.31)
Study other business -0.12 -0.03
(0.41) (0.33)
Study other -0.12 0.03
(0.41) (0.27)
Year of Study -0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08)
Final Mood 0.28** 0.72***
(0.13) (0.10)
outlier -0.27 -0.20
(0.42) (0.45)
International Student 0.21
-0.26
Initial Mood 0.62***
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Satisfaction (1) (2)
(0.13)
Risk -0.02
(0.05)
Male Dummy -0.14
(0.15)
Parent Lang Chinese -0.20
(0.21)
Parent Lang Other -0.17
(0.30)
Born East Asia -0.09
(0.29)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.01
(0.38)
Born Other 0.30
(0.36)
Notes:
Ordered probit estimation implemented.
Treatment dummies not included as satisfaction measured prior to priming.
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
Table 12: Ordered Probit Estimate of Influences on Moodchange
Regression Series
Change in Mood (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.05 -0.02 -0.05
(0.23) (0.27) (0.26)
Delayed -0.15 -0.05 -0.04
(0.21) (0.26) (0.24)
InteractionLD 0.27 0.21 0.22
(0.32) (0.36) (0.35)
High -0.22 -0.19 -0.17
(0.22) (0.26) (0.25)
Immediate -0.12 -0.16 -0.17
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
InteractionHI 0.27 0.21 0.22
(0.32) (0.36) (0.35)
Aspiration Ratio -0.12** -0.13** -0.12** -0.13**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Satisfaction 0.15* 0.14* 0.15* 0.14*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Father Edu 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Mother Edu -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Regression Series
Change in Mood (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Study Accounting 0.15* 0.03 0.15* 0.03
(0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31)
Study Finance -0.19 -0.31 -0.19 -0.31
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30)
Study other business -0.17 -0.21 -0.17 -0.21
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38)
Study other -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18
(0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
Year of Study 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
outlier 0.85** 0.76** 0.85** 0.76**
(0.37) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33)
Initial Mood -0.68*** -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.66***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Risk -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Real E↵ort 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Male Dummy 0.13 0.13
(0.18) (0.18)
International Student -0.30 -0.30
(0.25) (0.25)
Parent Lang Chinese 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
(0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.19)
Parent Lang Other 0.60** 0.55** 0.60** 0.55**
(0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26)
Born East Asia 0.11 0.11
(0.31) (0.31)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.17 0.17
(0.34) (0.34)
Born Other -0.02 -0.02
(0.34) (0.34)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
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D Robustness Test Results
Table 13: Summary With Alternate Inclusion Rule and Without Outliers
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HighImmediate
Aspirational Income 46 67641.3 20555.25 30000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 46 52836.96 13190.93 30000 95000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 46 1.299654 .3125227 .7142857 2.111111
LowImmediate
Aspirational Income 50 53220 15586.87 25000 100000
Average Salary Estimate 50 54700 16542.15 24000 110000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 50 1.000897 .2376628 .5 1.538462
HighDelayed
Aspirational Income 40 68050 28180.69 10000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 40 49175 10805.71 25000 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 40 1.415729 .5976884 .1818182 3
LowDelayed
Aspirational Income 45 62222.22 30454.8 15000 150000
Average Salary Estimate 45 44777.78 15162.59 10000 80000
Aspiration-Average Ratio 45 1.483561 .8639004 .3 6
Table 14: Excerpt of Estimate with Squared Control Terms
Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
Low -0.33*** High 0.49
(0.12) (0.33)
Delayed 0.37 Immediate -0.21
(0.23) (0.19)
InteractionLD -0.16 InteractionHI -0.16
(0.38) (0.38)
Father Edu -0.06* Father Edu -0.06*
(0.37) (0.37)
Father Edu2 0.11* Father Edu2 0.11*
(0.06) (0.06)
Mother Edu 0.71* Mother Edu 0.71*
(0.41) (0.41)
Mother Edu2 -0.14* Mother Edu2 -0.14*
(0.08) (0.08)
Risk -0.17 Risk -0.17
(0.11) (0.11)
Risk2 0.04 Risk2 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Real E↵ort 0.50* Real E↵ort 0.50*
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Aspirational to
Average Income ratio
(0.27) (0.27)
Real E↵ort2 -0.01* Real E↵ort2 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
outlier 5.46*** outlier 5.46***
(2.01) (2.01)
Estimate includes all control variables. Only relevant measures reported.
Table 17: VIF of Aspirational Income Es-
timate
VIF
Born E Asia 3.22
InteractionLD 3.18
Initial Mood 3.15
Study other 2.59
Final Mood 2.58
International 2.36
Delayed 2.28
PL Chinese 2.28
Born Asia SC 2.26
Accounting 2.23
Low 2.15
Satisfaction 2.04
Finance 1.91
Born Other 1.86
Other business 1.64
PL other 1.59
Mother Edu 1.59
Father Edu 1.45
Real E↵ort 1.18
Male 1.15
Yr of Study 1.15
outlier 1.14
Risk 1.13
Mean VIF 2.00
High Immediate is comparison
treatment in this estimate
Table 18: VIF of Aspirational Income Es-
timate (continued)
VIF
InteractionHI 3.58
Born E Asia 3.22
Initial Mood 3.15
Study other 2.59
Final Mood 2.58
High 2.53
International 2.36
Immediate 2.30
PL Chinese 2.28
Born Asia SC 2.26
Accounting 2.23
Satisfaction 2.04
Finance 1.91
Born Other 1.86
Other business 1.64
PL other 1.59
Mother Edu 1.59
Father Edu 1.45
Real E↵ort 1.18
Male 1.15
Yr of Study 1.15
outlier 1.14
Risk 1.13
Mean VIF 2.04
Low Delayed is comparison treat-
ment in this estimate
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Table 19: E↵ect of Priming on Domestic Students Only
Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low -0.36*** -0.25* -0.26**
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12)
Delayed 0.33 0.34 0.32
(0.30) (0.23) (0.23)
InteractionLD 0.05 -0.12 -0.18
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
High 0.30 0.37 0.44
(0.30) (0.26) (0.28)
Immediate -0.38*** -0.22 -0.14
(0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
InteractionHI 0.05 -0.12 -0.18
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
Satisfaction -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Father Edu 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Mother Edu 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Study Accounting 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Study Finance 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30)
Study other business 0.58* 0.54 0.58* 0.54
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34)
Study other -0.16 -0.05 -0.16 -0.05
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Year of Study 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Final Mood -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
outlier 2.37 2.67 2.37 2.67
(1.77) (1.96) (1.77) (1.96)
Initial Mood 0.09 0.09
(0.11) (0.11)
Risk -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Real E↵ort -0.05* -0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
Male Dummy -0.16 -0.16
(0.11) (0.11)
Parent Lang Chinese -0.22 -0.22
(0.20) (0.20)
Parent Lang Other -0.05 -0.05
(0.19) (0.19)
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Aspirational to Regression Series
Average Income ratio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Born East Asia 0.18 0.18
(0.19) (0.19)
Born Asia Sub cont 0.08 0.08
(0.26) (0.26)
Born Other 0.57 0.57
(0.33) (0.33)
cons 1.34*** 2.42*** 1.22*** 1.37*** 2.39*** 1.10**
(0.06) (0.68) (0.46) (0.08) (0.66) (0.45)
High Immediate is comparison treatment in columns 1 - 3
Low Delayed is comparison treatment in columns 4 - 6
Comparison Categories of Dummy Variables:
Parent Lang English, Born Aus/NZ, Study Economics/Econometrics
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